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Abstract 
Money is a fundamental and ubiquitous institution in modern economies. However, the question of its 
emergence remains a central one for economists. The monetary search-theoretic approach studies 
the conditions under which commodity money emerges as a solution to override frictions inherent to 
inter-individual exchanges in a decentralized economy. Although among these conditions, agents' 
rationality is classically essential and a prerequisite to any theoretical monetary equilibrium, human 
subjects often fail to adopt optimal strategies in tasks implementing a search-theoretic paradigm when 
these strategies are speculative, i.e., involve the use of a costly medium of exchange to increase the 
probability of subsequent and successful trades. In the present work, we hypothesize that 
implementing such speculative behaviors relies on reinforcement learning instead of lifetime utility 
calculations, as supposed by classical economic theory. To test this hypothesis, we operationalized 
the Kiyotaki and Wright paradigm of money emergence in a multi-step exchange task and fitted 
behavioral data regarding human subjects performing this task with two reinforcement learning 
models. Each of them implements a distinct cognitive hypothesis regarding the weight of future or 
counterfactual rewards in current decisions. We found that both models outperformed theoretical 
predictions about subjects' behaviors regarding the implementation of speculative strategies and that 
the latter relies on the degree of the opportunity costs consideration in the learning process. 
Speculating about the marketability advantage of money thus seems to depend on mental simulations 
of counterfactual events that agents are performing in exchange situations. 
 
Significance Statement 
In the present study, we applied reinforcement learning models that are not classically used in 
experimental economics to a multi-step exchange task of the emergence of money derived from a 
classic search-theoretic paradigm for the emergence of money. This method allowed us to highlight 
the importance of counterfactual feedback processing of opportunity costs in the learning process of 
speculative use of money and the predictive power of reinforcement learning models for multi-step 
economic tasks. Those results constitute a new step toward understanding the learning processes at 
work in multi-step economic decision making and the cognitive micro-foundations of the macro-
economic use of money.  
Introduction 
Money is both a very complex social phenomenon and easy to manipulate in everyday basic 
transactions. It is an institutional solution to common frictions in an exchange economy, such as the 
absence of double coincidence of wants between traders (1). It is of widespread use in spite of its 
being dominated in terms of rate of return by all other assets (2). However, it can be speculatively 
used in a fundamental sense: its economically dominated holding can be justified by the anticipation of 
future trading opportunities that are not available at the present moment but will necessitate this 
particular holding. In this study, we concentrate on a paradigm of commodity-money emergence in 
which one of the goods exchanged in the economy becomes the selected medium of exchange in 
spite of its storage being costlier than any other good. This is typical monetary speculation, in contrast 
to other types of speculation, which consist in expecting an increased price on the market of a good in 
the future. The price of money does not vary – only the opportunity that it can afford in the future does. 
This seems to us to be an important feature of speculative economic behavior relative to the otherwise 
apparently irrational holding of such a good. We study whether individuals endowed with some 
information about future exchange opportunities will tend to consider a financially dominated good as 
a medium for exchange.  
Modern behaviorally founded theories of the emergence of money and monetary equilibrium (3, 4) are 
jointly based on the idea of minimizing a trading search process and on individual choices of 
accepting, declining, or postponing immediate exchanges at different costs incurred. We focus on an 
influent paradigm by Kiyotaki and Wright (KW hereafter) (4) in which the individual choice of accepting 
temporarily costly exchanges due to the anticipation of later better trading opportunities is precisely 
stylized as a speculative behavior and yields a corresponding monetary equilibrium. The environment 
of this paradigm consists of N agents specialized in terms of both consumption and production in such 
a manner that there is initially no double coincidence of wants. Frictions in the exchange process 
create a necessity for at least some of the agents to trade for goods that they do not produce or 
consume, which are then used as media of exchange. The ultimate goal of agents – that is, to 
consume – may then require multiple steps to be achieved. The most interesting part is that in some 
configurations, the optimal medium of exchange (i.e., the good that maximizes expected utility 
because of its relatively high marketability) can be concomitantly the costlier good to store. Accepting 
this costly medium of exchange refers in the KW paradigm to the "speculative strategy": the agent 
accepts carrying the high storing cost burden to maximize its chance to consume in the future. Our 
question is how individuals can learn to use this multi-step speculative strategy in this environment, 
disregarding current cost increases in favor of longer-term benefits. It therefore locates at the 
intersection of a particular type of economic game, an application of learning models to individual 
behaviors in this type of game, and an underlying question about the cognitive underpinnings of the 
speculative use of money. 
In the last few decades, behavioral economics experiments have repeatedly suggested that basic 
cognitive processes such as reinforcement learning potentially better accounts for subjects’ choice 
behavior compared to theoretical equilibrium predictions (5, 6). Erev and Roth systematically studied a 
set of well-known economic games from that perspective (5) and found that a one-parameter 
reinforcement learning model consistently outperforms the theoretical equilibrium predictions (6). The 
analysis of the learning processes in games typically implies repetition of a similar choice. Each 
repetition of the game – or in other terms, each step of the learning process – yields a payoff that 
strategically depends on the actions of other players involved in the same game and its repetition. In 
contrast, we analyze a game structure that is inherently more complex in the sense that the payoff of 
the action (in our case, the consumption of a given good for each agent in that structure) is reached 
after performing several actions that are not identical. The basic game is then a multiple-step one, 
different from the typical game structures to which learning models have been applied. For instance, to 
consume, an agent must accept in a first trial a medium of exchange and then trade the medium for 
her/his consumption good in a following trial. Thus, learning by reinforcement in this setting requires 
retention and updating of multiple values of actions available in different states of the world, with not 
all of the actions being directly connected to the final goal of agents. Reinforcement learning models 
generally used in economics, such as the Roth and Erev model (5, 6) and variants of the classic 
Rescorla-Wagner and matching law models, were not conceived to take into account this learning 
process and thus would not be able to learn to speculate in the KW environment, a strategy that 
requires adding value to the immediately worst action available in states of the world only remotely 
connected to the final agents' goals.  
To model learning in such a complex environment, several solutions can be envisioned. In the present 
study, we contrast the predictions of two different reinforcement learning models, each involving a 
specific cognitive process. The first is a temporal difference reinforcement learning (TD-RL) model, 
which allows the value to back-propagate from one state to previous ones while not assuming any 
knowledge about the structure of the task. This model implements the process via which an individual 
learns inter-temporal reinforcement contingencies by accounting for future rewards when making 
decisions in the present. This account for future rewards has the potential to assign some positive 
value to a behavior whose direct outcome (i.e., the outcome at time t) is negative if it leads to rewards 
in the future (i.e., the outcome at time t+1). In the KW environment that we analyze, this situation 
emerges following the speculative strategy. Speculative behaviors in the KW environment are thus 
explained in terms of temporally discounted future reward expectations. The second model is an 
opportunity costs reinforcement learning model inspired by previous studies about learning to 
speculate (7). This model allows the value to propagate from hypothetical to actual states thanks to 
counterfactual thinking and requires a minimal, but explicit, knowledge about the task structure. In this 
model, the agent compares the actual outcome that he or she received in a particular state to the 
outcome that he or she could have potentially received holding a different good (i.e., a different 
medium of exchange). This counterfactual comparison defines the opportunity costs. Speculative 
behaviors in the KW environment are thus explained in terms of a solution to minimize the opportunity 
costs of not holding the speculative medium of exchange.  
The present computational analysis contrasts two possible cognitive mechanisms of speculative 
behavior by fitting reinforcement learning models to a multi-step trading problem used as an 
experimental paradigm for the emergence of money. We show that compared to theoretical 
equilibrium predictions, simple reinforcement learning models better account for speculative behaviors 
in a KW environment and that the winning model relies on the consideration of opportunity costs rather 
than inter-temporal cost-benefit trade-offs.  
Results 
Behavioral task. We collected behavioral data from 53 subjects performing an exchange task derived 
from an economic theoretical model for the emergence of money (4) and adapted from a previous 
implementation of this model (7, 8) (see SI and/or methods for supplementary details). The 
participants were a part of a virtual economy in which all agents were specialized in terms of both 
consumption and production according to 3 different types (Fig. 1A). At each time step, participants 
were randomly matched and had to decide whether they wanted to exchange the unique good that 
they were storing for the only good that the other agent stored. To inform agents' decisions, circulating 
goods were differentiated following the 3 same aforementioned types, costly to store from one time 
step to the next one (Fig. 1D) and brought utility when consumed by the corresponding type agents 
(Fig. 1E). Initially, production and consumption specializations prevented a double coincidence of 
wants in each random pair of agents such that some of them, to consume in a more or less remote 
future, had to exchange the good that they produced for a good that they did not produce nor 
consume (Fig. 1B). When the latter good is less costly to store than the one they previously had in 
storage, the corresponding exchange strategy is called "fundamental" and derives from direct cost 
reduction (i.e., direct utility maximization). When this good is costlier to store than the one that they 
previously had in storage, the corresponding exchange strategy is called "speculative" and implies a 
direct loss in utility combined with an anticipated and indirect utility gain in the following time step(s). 
This strategy is based on the good’s marketability perceived to be higher than that of the previously 
stored good, in other words, the probability of exchanging the new good for the consumption good in 
the future is greater. The choice between fundamental and speculative strategy can then be reduced 
to an inter-temporal comparison between current costs and future marketability. The economy was 
parameterized such that virtual agents behaved according to the speculative equilibrium strategies 
from the beginning (Fig. 1C), which means that the optimal strategy for participants (who were all of 
the same type) was the speculative one, with the speculative good’s marketability outpacing its direct 
cost disadvantage. 
Behavioral Results. As previously observed (7–9), subjects do not generally speculate as much as 
predicted by the theory. At the population level, the average speculation frequency was 0.39 ± 0.05, 
whereas the theoretically expected frequency is 1.00. To better describe how subjects used 
speculative and non-speculative strategies, we arbitrarily divided our population into two groups: those 
who speculate more than 50% of the time are simply classified as "speculators", and those who do not 
are classified as "non-speculators". The two groups exhibited, by definition, distinct behavior overall 
(Average Speculation Frequencies: 0.77 ± 0.04 for speculators and 0.15 ± 0.03 for non-speculators) 
(Fig. 3A, left-panel; Table 2). It should be noted that a speculation rate lower than the equilibrium 
prediction is not per se a guarantee that speculative behavioral is acquired gradually, as a learning 
process would predict. To assess whether speculative behavior was due to a learning process, we 
analyzed the temporal dynamics by comparing the first and last trials. Crucially, speculators seem to 
learn to speculate over time, whereas non-speculators learn not to speculate. Indeed, the speculation 
rate significantly increases from 0.43±0.11 to 0.86±0.08 in speculators (McNemar's 𝜒! = 4.9231, p-
value = 0.0265) and significantly decreases from 0.34±0.09 to 0.09±0.05 in non-speculators 
(McNemar's 𝜒! = 4.9, p-value = 0.02686). The dichotomy cannot then be reduced to a static difference 
in implemented strategies but should instead be considered the result of the dynamic interaction of 
learning agents and the environment.  
Computational Hypotheses. To investigate subjects' behavior in this setting and reveal unobservable 
learning process parameters, we used a classic temporal-difference reinforcement learning (hereafter 
TD-RL) model (10–12) (see SI and/or method for supplementary details) and a newly designed 
opportunity costs reinforcement learning (hereafter OC-RL) model. 
We used the Q-learning implementation of TD-RL, which is by far the most frequently used model in 
cognitive psychology (13). Two features make this model particularly suited to track advantages and 
disadvantages of both fundamental and speculative strategies over time. First, the algorithm computes 
the outcome of a particular action taken in a given state as the sum of the reward immediately 
received and the discounted expected reward from the next state (Fig. 2A and methods for 
supplementary details). In other words, the TD-RL model allows consideration of future rewards in the 
learning process. Accordingly, the acceptation at time 𝑡 of a good that is costlier to store (i.e., 
speculation) can be associated with a positive value in spite of the direct loss that it leads to if the time 𝑡 + 1 state attained has a much more positive value (i.e., the acquisition of the agent's consumption 
good) (Fig. 3A). The second feature, essential to implement a speculative behavior, is the possibility 
to explore the environment. This possibility is implemented in our model via a softmax policy (or 
decision rule) associated with a temperature parameter (see Methods, Eq. 3), which together allow 
the choice of an option, which is a priori not the most advantageous one. In our setting, accepting a 
costlier-to-store good is a priori not the best option for a subject seeking to maximize her/his direct 
utility. However, the possibility to accept the costlier-to-store good anyway is the first and compulsory 
step to valorize it subsequently. 
The second model (OC-RL) is a reinforcement learning model that is able to learn from counterfactual 
situations through the calculation of opportunity costs. In addition to learning the value of the available 
actions in each state (i.e., to accept or refuse the exchange), the model also learns the value of the 
good stored in the same states. Those values are then updated each time the good is held in 
situations in which there is no possibility to obtain the other storable good, taking into account the 
reward obtained at the end of the trial and additionally, in case of non-exchange, the opportunity cost 
of holding this particular good instead of the other storable good (Fig. 2B). For instance, an agent 
unable to exchange his production good for his consumption good reduces the value of holding it by 
the maximum value he could have expected to obtain by holding the speculative good instead in this 
situation (Fig. 3B). Contrary to the TD-RL, the OC-RL model enhances the relative value of the 
speculative good initially by devaluating the one of the production good (Fig. 3C). A common feature 
of the two models is the possibility to explore the environment through a softmax decision rule. 
However, contrary to the TD-RL model, an a priori exploration is in the OC-RL model not a 
precondition to increase the relative value of the speculation good. The latter can indeed be enhanced 
by the deterioration of the production good value because of the opportunity cost. 
Model comparison. We fitted the behavioral data with both models of interest and used Bayesian 
model comparison to establish which model better accounted for the data (through their respective 
predictive performance). For each model, we estimated the optimal free parameters by maximizing the 
likelihood of observing the participants’ choices, given the models and the best fitting parameters (see 
SI and Methods for further details). The exceedance probability and models’ frequency based on the 
log-likelihood used as an approximation of the model evidence indicated that the OC-RL model better 
accounted for speculative behavior compared to the TD-RL model (XP = 0.9999) (14) (Table 1, Fig. 
4B). To attest to the validity of our selection procedure, we performed a model recovery analysis (15) 
(Fig. 4A), generating two different data sets with simulated agents behaving according to the two 
respective algorithms (n = 5300, i.e., 100 * cohort size). We then fitted the newly generated data, 
adopting the same procedure as for the behavioral data. As presented in Fig. 4A, the optimization 
procedure recognizes as the best-fitting model the generative model for our two models of interest, 
thus attesting that the two models are identifiable within the task (15). 
Model simulations. To confirm the model comparison result, we analyzed the model-predicted 
speculative choice rate on average and as a function of the trial number. We found that the OC-RL 
model predictions were closer to the observed data compared to the predictions of the TD-RL model. 
At the aggregate level, we found no significant difference between the average speculation 
frequencies observed in the subjects and those predicted by the OC-RL model (data: 0.39 ± 0.05, OC-
RL: 0.39 ± 0.05, zval = 1.17, pval = 0.24, signed-rank test), but we found this difference to be 
significant for the TD-RL model (TD-RL: 0.35 ± 0.04, zval = 5.09, pval < 0.001, signed-rank test).  At 
the group level, we found similarly that the average speculation frequencies observed and predicted 
by the OC-RL model were not significantly different for both speculators (data: 0.77 ± 0.04, OC-RL: 
0.76 ± 0.03, zval = 0.68, pval = 0.50, signed-rank test) and non-speculators (data: 0.15 ± 0.03 OC-RL: 
0.14 ± 0.03, zval = 0.64, pval = 0.52, signed-rank test), whereas there were significant differences for 
the TD-RL model (TD-RL: speculators: 0.67 ± 0.04, zval = 4.01, pval < 0.001; non-speculators: 
0.14 ± 0.03, zval = 2.32, pval = 0.0204, signed-rank tests). This latter result is reflected in the 
dynamics of the average speculation in both groups (Fig. 4C, D & E), particularly in the speculators 
group, for which the TD-RL predictions (Fig. D) systematically underestimate the actual average 
speculation evolution across trials (Fig. C), contrary to the predictions of the OC-RL model (Fig. E). 
Finally, at the individual level, we found that the individual speculation frequencies predicted by the 
OC-RL model correlated almost perfectly with the observed frequencies (OC-RL: R = 0.99), indicating 
that the categorical result based on our cutoff of speculation still holds on a continuous scale (Fig. S2). 
 
Computational phenotypes of speculation. Our model comparison indicates that a model 
implementing opportunity costs accounts for speculative behaviors in a KW environment. Accordingly, 
we found that the opportunity cost learning rate 𝜔 (i.e., the feature of this model that allows accounting 
for missing speculative opportunities) was significantly different for speculators and non-speculators 
(non-speculators: 0.05 ± 0.02, speculators: 0.21 ± 0.07, zval = 3.76, pval < 0.001, two-sided Wilcoxon 
rank sum test), whereas both the temperature and the factual learning rate were the same across 
groups (temperature: non-speculators: 0.11 ± 0.04, speculators: 0.18 ± 0.06, zval = 0.68, pval = 0.50; 
learning rate: non-speculators: 0.26 ± 0.05, speculators: 0.24 ± 0.07, zval = 1.35, pval = 0.18, two-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests) (Fig. 4F). Thus, the relative account of opportunity costs in the agents' 
value estimation process through the counterfactual learning rate 𝜔 seems to be the key feature to 
understand and predict both speculative and non-speculative behaviors in the KW environment. The 
more the opportunity costs are accounted for (i.e., the greater 𝜔 is), the more striking the advantage of 
the speculative strategy. 
	  
Discussion 
We found that in a multistep monetary exchange task, subjects' behaviors were better explained by a 
counterfactual reinforcement learning model implementing opportunity costs than by a temporal 
difference reinforcement learning model. To note, both of these models clearly outperformed 
theoretical predictions about speculative strategy on average, in addition to its dynamic changes. 
Bayesian model comparison and fine-grained analysis of model simulations indicated that the 
opportunity-cost model outperformed the temporal-different model in terms of their capacity to explain 
subjects’ behavior for both the speculators and non-speculators.  
The paradigm that we studied operationalizes the Kiyotaki and Wright search theoretical model of 
money emergence (4) and is adapted from a previous implementation of the latter (7, 8). The 
particularity of the task, in comparison to those generally used to study reinforcement learning 
processes in economics (5, 6, 16–19), is its multistep structure, which involves several different 
actions to be performed to attain the ultimate goal of the game. This particular setting is essential to 
understand how an action available in an intermediary step only remotely connected to a reward or to 
the final goal of agents (i.e., in our case, consumption) and thus not locally maximizing any utility – or 
even minimizing the latter – is learned. This type of temporarily suboptimal intermediary decisions is 
common in our economic lives – think of speculating on stock options in a down market – and daily 
lives – purchasing an umbrella on a sunny day. The two mechanisms hypothesized to underlie such 
behavior that we tested are based on the consideration of inter-temporal and counterfactual outcomes, 
respectively. 
Our computational analysis indicates that learning to use a costly yet optimal medium of exchange 
depends on the account of counterfactuals in the updating process. Counterfactuals, extensively 
studied in psychology (20) and neuroscience (21, 22), can be observed as mental simulations of what 
could have been, compared to what actually occurred. In the OC-RL model, comparison of the two 
allows agents to learn about the marketability advantage of holding the speculative good compared to 
their production good. The different situations that an agent actually experiences holding a certain 
good, together with the simulation of the same situations but holding the other good, shape in a 
stepwise manner the respective and relative values of these two goods. These values will be put to 
use by the agent at the moment to decide which good to hold.  
We implement and operationalize the notion of speculation in a very stylized manner, relative to a 
particular economic model of money emergence in a barter economy. We do not pretend to cover 
every aspect of speculation here, and other studies about learning in financial markets must be 
considered (23–25). However, the speculative behaviors that we studied can be linked to this common 
sense, insofar as holding money to realize subsequent profitable exchanges is a possible, usual and 
even fundamental sense of speculation (26, 27). Indeed, money in our environment is the only asset 
with which agents can possibly speculate given information about future exchange opportunities. In 
real economies, most assets present dominant futures in terms of monetary holdings. Interestingly, 
reinforcement learning has been found to play a role in real-world financial environments, where 
investors experienced returns in the past impact future personal investments (28, 29), and 
counterfactual thinking has been proposed as a mechanism underlying stocks repurchase behavior of 
both subjects in the lab (30) and real investors (31). In the two latter studies, the price evolution of a 
particular good not held at the moment is the counterfactual information used by investors in their 
subsequent choices. In our setting, good prices being fixed, this counterfactual information is the 
situation-dependent marketability of the good not held at this precise moment.  
The concept of money that we used is model-driven. It endogenously emerges from economic 
exchanges, and its value is determined through production, exchange and consumption in the 
economy. Its value is intrinsic and can be assimilated to a so-called commodity money having intrinsic 
value in addition to its role in exchange (1). The acceptance of such a good relies upon immediate 
interests of the agents, and this motivates applying reinforcement learning to this context. There exist 
other concepts and types of money, and further studies could consider the application of 
reinforcement learning and the relevance of learning processes to the analysis of behavior with 
respect to money in its fuller varieties. We indeed live in an economy of fiat money that has no intrinsic 
value and the price of which is exogenously determined by monetary institutions on which agents have 
no direct impact. Adaptations to these external institutions may involve reinforcement learning issues, 
simply if we consider fluctuations of money price, risk of money illusion, and failure to process and act 
on the correct signals of the whole economy. Moreover, fiat money as a secondary reinforcer (i.e., 
having similar reinforcement properties as a primary reinforcer, such as food, by being associated with 
the latter) has been repeatedly evidenced in appetitive (32, 33) and aversive conditioning (34, 35). In 
this sense, our study shed some light on the process by which a type of money ‘in the making’ 
acquires this secondary reinforcing property through strategic interactions and the cognitive traits 
underlying this process. The fact that both primary and secondary reinforcers have been found to rely 
on overlapping neural regions (36) raises an intriguing question that could be addressed in a future 
study dedicated to exploring whether the reward-related neural activity from using a speculative 
medium of exchange evolves in speculators toward an overlapping of the neural representation of the 
latter and the one of the consumption good. 
An important aspect of our results is the inter-individual variability regarding the use of this speculative 
commodity money. Both groups of subjects were found to learn over time to adopt it, or on the 
contrary, to reject it. This aspect is reminiscent of Carl Menger in "On the origin of money" (1892): 
“Nothing may have been so favorable to the genesis of a medium of exchange as the 
acceptance, on the part of the most discerning and capable economic subjects, for their own 
economic gain, of eminently saleable goods in preference to all others.” 
Speculators in our experiments would refer to those particularly discerning subjects, extracting from 
their experience the relatively high saleability of the speculative good. Our computational results tend 
to indicate that this variability relies on the integration of counterfactual outcomes in the value-updating 
process. 
A limitation of our study concerns the generalizability of the OC-RL model. In its current form, the OC-
RL model would not be easily transferable to other tasks because of its tight adequacy to the specific 
structure of the money emergence paradigm. Particularly, the algorithm distinguishes between two 
types of states, those in which the agent can decide which good to hold in the next step and those in 
which he does not have such a choice, and this feature is characteristic of the operationalized KW 
environment that we used. In this sense, the OC-RL model lies between model-free algorithms that 
learn by trial and error and model-based algorithms that make use of the structure of the task to make 
decisions (37, 38). Generally, model-based algorithms involve the acquisition of a "cognitive map" of 
the task (38, 39), describing how different states are connected and agents learn, through state-
prediction-error, these state transitions. Whereas the OC-RL model neither knows nor learns the full 
task structure, it is able to differentiate some states from others. Few adjustments would then be 
needed to adapt the OC-RL model to other tasks. The counterfactual feedback processing per se is 
highly flexible and adaptable while permitting a richer knowledge of the learning environment (40). 
Although the OC-RL model outperforms the TD-RL models in terms of its predictive power at the 
population level, this result does not mean that inter-temporal valuation of future rewards is totally 
irrelevant in the process of learning to speculate and that no subject implemented this computational 
process to account for these rewards instead of or in addition to the counterfactual learning of 
opportunity costs. Further studies would be necessary to clarify the possible interaction between the 
two processes, and one can easily envision a hybrid model that accounts for both types of reward 
simultaneously, at the price, though, of greater computational complexity.	
 
 
	 	
Materials	and	Methods	
Sample. Our sample included 53 healthy subjects (30 females and 23 males between the ages of 20 
and 41 years old, with a median age of 24 years old). The participants earned a fixed amount of 
money (10€) for their participation and had the possibility to double this amount according to their 
performance. Indeed, 20 consecutive trials were drawn, and the total number of points accumulated in 
those 20 rounds was transformed into a probability of winning the extra 10€. The experimental 
protocol was in accordance with experimental economics standards such that subjects were perfectly 
informed about the economic game functioning and the remuneration rules (i.e., there was no 
deception throughout the experimental process). 
Behavioral Task. The exchange task is based on the Kiyotaki and Wright model of money emergence 
(4) and adapted with a few slight variations from a previous implementation of the model (7, 8). 
The experimental economy. There are three different types of good, 1, 2 and 3 (corresponding to the 
color codes cyan, yellow and magenta, respectively), and the same three types of agents are 
represented in equal number (480/3 agents of each type). Each agent of type 𝑖 is specialized in 
consumption and production such that he consumes good 𝑖 and produces good  (modulo 3) (Fig. 
1A). The experiment is divided into 200 trials. For a subject, each trial consists of an exchange 
opportunity with a virtual agent with whom he has been randomly paired. The same also occurs to any 
virtual agent in the economy. Agents can store only one good at a time (i.e., from one trial to the next), 
and each good type has a fixed storage cost that is common to all agents and defined such that 𝑐! < 𝑐! <  𝑐! (Fig. 1D). Producing a good is cost-free and automatically occurs after consumption. 
Consumption brings utility, the value of which is also common to each type of agent and fulfills the 
following condition: 𝑐! < 𝑐! <  𝑐! < 𝑢 (Fig. 1E). The economy is initialized with all agents storing their 
production good (Fig. 1B); they then face a problem called the absence of double coincidence of 
wants (i.e., no matched agents will be able to trade and obtain both of their consumption goods at the 
same time). Virtual agents play deterministically according to the prediction of the steady-state 
equilibrium implied by the chosen parameters (Table S1). More precisely, agents of all types always 
accept their consumption good and refuse to trade when proposed the same good that they are 
already storing or when the partner is of the same type regardless of the good that the latter is storing. 
In cases in which they are proposed a good that they neither produce nor consume, types 2 and 3 
agents use a "fundamental" strategy by accepting only a less-costly-to-store good. "Fundamental" 
here refers to direct utility maximization. In such cases, type 1 agents use a "speculative" strategy and 
then accept the costlier-to-store good type 3 (i.e., the good that they neither produce nor consume). 
The latter strategy is optimal given the parameterization of the economy, which is in accordance with a 
speculative equilibrium (Fig. 1C). The increase in direct storage cost that type 1 agents suffer is 
compensated by the higher marketability of the type 3 good. In other words, the probability of 
exchanging the type 3 good for the consumption good in following trials is higher than the probability 
of exchanging the production good. 
Subjects’ task. All subjects played in different virtual economies and were all type 1 agents. They 
played a fixed number of trials decomposed as followed (Fig. 1E): 
1. A focus screen. 
2. The market state screen, where subjects were informed of the proportion of each good type in 
each population type. 
3. The choice screen, where subjects discovered the agent with whom they were randomly 
matched and had to decide whether they wanted to exchange the good that they were storing 
for the good that the other agent stored. 
4. The exchange screen, where subjects observed the result of the exchange.  
5. The outcome screen, where subjects were prompted with the actual storage cost, the 
eventual consumption, the net number of points earned at the end of the trial, and the total 
number of points earned from the beginning of the block. 
Discrepancies between our implementation and the previous one. Our model implementation is based 
on a treatment of Duffy's task "Eliminating Noise: Automating the Decisions of Type 2 and Type 3 
Players" (7). We made three essential changes in our experiment, all oriented toward the goal of 
transforming a learning/coordination problem into a pure learning problem. First, we automatized all 
but one virtual agent, including those of type 1, to further "eliminate" noise in the subjects' 
environment. Second, we increased the number of trials and eliminated the session subdivision into 
blocks to give the subjects more time to learn and interact with the rest of the economy without being 
perturbed by economy re-initializations. Third, we increased the number of virtual agents (480 instead 
of a maximum of 24 previously) to standardize and stabilize the proportions of each types of good 
stored by each type of agent. This modification allowed the virtual economy to run much closer to the 
equilibrium predictions (Fig. S1). 
Computational Modeling. We fitted the data with two reinforcement learning models: a temporal 
difference model (TD-RL) and an opportunity costs model (OC-RL). The model space included then 
the standard Q-learning model originally introduced by Watkins (10–12) and a newly designed 
reinforcement learning model based on opportunity costs. The models are described under the 
perspective of type 1 agent modeling, the only agent type in which we are interested in this study. 
Q-Learning model (TD-RL). This model is a classic off-policy reinforcement learning model. For each 
exchange situation (characterized by the stored goods' type, the proposed goods' type and the 
partner's type), the model estimates the expected choices and outcomes. These Q-values essentially 
represent the expected reward obtained by taking a particular option in a given context, here, the 
exchange of the stored good for the proposed good and the non-exchange of this good. In both 
experiments, Q-values were set for all situations, in accordance with the goods' costs and utility. The 
action value of refusing an exchange was set equal to the cost of the good stored at the moment of 
exchange. The action value of accepting an exchange was set to the net utility of the proposed good 
(i.e., the utility that it eventually provides in case of consumption minus the cost of the good to be 
stored until the next round). These priors on the initial Q-values are based on the fact that subjects 
were explicitly informed in the instructions about the different storing costs and the utility value of 
consumption. After every trial 𝑡, the value of the chosen option 𝑎! ("accepting the exchange" or 
"refusing the exchange", henceforth, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 and 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒, respectively) in the state 𝑠! is updated 
according to the following rule: 
 
where  is the prediction error and calculated as  𝛿! = 𝑟! + 𝛾 max!!!!∈𝒜𝑄! 𝑠!!!, 𝑎!!! − 𝑄! 𝑠! , 𝑎! # 2  
where 𝑟! is the reward obtained as an outcome of choosing 𝑎! in the state 𝑠! and max!!!!∈𝒜 𝑄! 𝑠!!!, 𝑎!!!  the maximum of the action values of the 𝑡 + 1 state. In other words, the 
prediction error  is the difference between the expected reward 𝑄! 𝑠! , 𝑎!  and the actual reward 
. The reward magnitude range is [-0.09; 0.96], from the net utility of the 
costlier-to-store good to the net utility of the consumption good. The learning rate, 𝛼, is a scaling 
parameter that adjusts the amplitude of value changes from one trial to the next, and the discount 
factor, 𝛾, is a scaling parameters that adjust the value of future outcomes. Following this rule, option 
values are increased if the outcome is better than expected and decreased in the opposite case, and 
the amplitude of the update is similar following positive and negative prediction errors. Finally, given 
the Q-values, the associated probability (or likelihood) of selecting each option is estimated by 
implementing the softmax decision rule for choosing accept, which is as follows: 
𝑃! 𝑠! , 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = 𝑒! !!,!""#$%!𝑒!! !!,!""#$%! + 𝑒!! !!,!"#$%"! # 3  
This rule is a standard stochastic decision rule that calculates the probability of selecting one of a set 
of options according to their associated values. The temperature, 𝛽, is another scaling parameter that 
adjusts the stochasticity of decision-making and by doing so controls the exploration–exploitation 
trade-off. 
The Opportunity Costs Reinforcement-Learning model (OC-RL model). This model is a model-based 
reinforcement learning model that we developed to implement opportunity costs within a reinforcement 
learning process. It has been inspired in its integration of opportunity costs by a half-deterministic half-
reinforcement learning model previously presented to explain speculative behaviors in a KW 
environment (7). It distinguishes two types of exchange situations in the KW environment. The first 
type corresponds to situations in which an agent has the opportunity to exchange the good that he is 
storing for another storable good (type 1 agents can store only types 2 and 3 goods; the first type of 
situations concerns exchanges involving those two goods). In such situations, agents decide what 
type of good they prefer holding. The second type corresponds to situations in which the agent has the 
opportunity to exchange the good that he is storing for his consumption good or a same-type good. 
They then constitute the experience the agent has with the good that he is storing. The experience is 
positive when he is able to consume and negative when he has to wait another round to eventually 
consume. As implemented in the Q-learning, the values of actions (i.e., accept or reject the exchange) 
for each exchange situation take the form of Q-values, updated according to two distinct learning rules 
depending on the situation types described above. 
In the "experience" situations (second type), the Q-values are updated with the same rule as they are 
in the q-learning model (eq. 1), but the prediction error is differently defined in the sense that it does 
not include future rewards (i.e., 𝛾 = 0). The predictions error becomes 𝛿! = 𝑟! − 𝑄! 𝑠!! , 𝑎! # 4  
The agent is thus myopic regarding future rewards attainable in following states. Note that the notation 
of states  in the OC-RL model includes a specification about which good is held in this state, . 
In the "storing good choice" situations (first type), only two values are used for all situations, the value 
of holding good 2 and the value of holding good 3. Those values are computed and updated in the 
"experience" situations according to a principle of classical conditioning and including opportunity 
costs. Each time that an agent receives an outcome from a choice in the "experience" situations, he 
updates not only the Q-value of the corresponding choice as previously described but also the value of 
holding the good that he had in storage at the beginning of the trial. For instance, if a type 1 agent 
holds a type 2 good, accepts to exchange it for his consumption good, and is successful at doing so, 
he updates the Q-value of the action "accept" in this situation and the value of holding the type 2 good 
in general. Now, to implement opportunity costs, two cases must be defined. The first is the case of a 
realized exchange (i.e., when both matched agents mutually agree on it), in which the held good value 
is updated with the same rule used for actions' Q-value in "experience" situations (eq. 1) and with a 
similar prediction error calculation: 𝛿! = 𝑟! − 𝑉!(𝑔!)# 5  
where 𝑉!(𝑔!) is the value of the good hold at the beginning of the round. Note that the same learning 
rate 𝛼 is used here as the information concerned actual outcomes. A second learning rate 𝜔 for 
"counterfactual" information is introduced below. 
The second case concerns unrealized exchanges in which the value of the good held at the beginning 
of the trial is updated in a similar manner but with a second learning rate 𝜔 and a prediction error 
including opportunity costs. The updating rule is then 𝑉!!!(𝑔!) =  𝑉!(𝑔!) + 𝜔𝛿′!# 6  
with 𝛿′! calculated as follows: 𝛿′! = 𝑟! − 𝑂𝐶!(𝑔!) − 𝑉!(𝑔!)# 7  
where 𝑂𝐶!(𝑔!) is the opportunity cost of holding good ℎ instead of −ℎ and equals 𝑂𝐶!(𝑔!) = max!!∈𝒜𝑄! 𝑠!!! , 𝑎! # 8  
where  is the maximum value expected from choosing action 𝑎 in the same situation 
but holding −ℎ instead of ℎ. 
We implemented the same decision rule as for the Q-learning, namely, a softmax policy. For choice in 
"experience" situations, the equation is the same as before (eq. 3), whereas for "storing good choice" 
situations, the equation becomes 
 
Model Comparison. 
We optimized the model parameters by minimizing the negative log-likelihood of the data given 
different parameters settings using Matlab’s 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 function, as previously described (41). 
Parameter recovery analyses based on model simulations show that our parameter optimization 
procedure and model selection correctly retrieves the generating model as the wining model (Fig. 2A 
and Fig. 3A). Note that as our two models of interest have the same number of degrees of freedom 
(i.e., 3 free parameters each), we did not have to take into account their complexity in the model 
comparison when calculating the Bayesian and Akaike information criterion. Individual negative log-
likelihoods values were fed into 𝑚𝑏𝑏 − 𝑣𝑏 − 𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑥 (14), a procedure that estimates the expected 
frequencies and the exceedance probability for each model within a set of models, given the data 
gathered from all participants. The exceedance probability (denoted XP) is the probability that a given 
model fits the data   better than all other models in the set. 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1 | Behavioral Task and Economy Parameters. A Agent Specialization. The table represents 
each of the three types of agents active in the economy. Their type (color) corresponds to the 
consumption good (i.e., the good associated with a positive utility). Crucially, each type of agents does 
not produce the good associated with consumption utility. A unit of the production good is immediately 
generated after the consumption of the wanted good. B Economy Initialization. The economy is 
initialized without double coincidence of wants, making triangular exchanges necessary for each agent 
to obtain their consumption good. This situation creates the need for some agents to trade for a good 
that they neither produce nor consume. C Speculative Equilibrium Illustration. The illustration 
represents all possible exchanges resulting from steady-state speculative equilibrium strategies that 
maximize each agent’s utility. In our virtual economy, all agents behave deterministically in 
accordance with the speculative equilibrium-prescribed strategies.  D Storage Costs. Storage costs 
are different across types of goods; however, the storage costs are the same for all types of agent. 
Storage costs are paid at the end of every trial. E Consumption Utility. The utility of consuming is 
greater than the storage cost of any type of good for all types of agents. In our experiment, the 
consumption utility was the same across all types of agent (100 points). F Time Course of a Trial. The 
diagram represents a trial in which the subject is a blue agent (i.e., type 1 agent, as all subjects in our 
experiment). To focus attention, subjects were first shown a fixation cross. The ‘market’ screen 
illustrated the repartition of the goods across each type of agent. During the ‘choice’ screen, subjects 
made a binary choice (accept or reject the exchange) with a randomly matched agent. The ‘exchange’ 
screen informed about the outcome of the exchange, which was effective if and only if both parties 
agreed on exchanging their respective goods. Finally, the ‘outcome’ screen summarizes the amount of 
points earned in the case of a consumption event and the amount of points lost in payment of the 
storing cost. 
 
 
Fig. 2 | Schematic description of the update processes in each model. A Temporal Difference 
Reinforcement Learning (TD-RL) model. The diagram represents the Q-learning algorithm. For each 
state 𝑠, the agent computes, maintains, and updates the value of the available actions 𝑄 𝑠! , 𝑎 . At 
each time t, the probability of choosing a given action 𝑃 𝑠! , 𝑎!  is calculated by feeding the action 
values to a softmax function. The selected action 𝑎! leads an outcome and a state transition 𝑠!!!. 
The agent updates the value of the chosen action 𝑄 𝑠! , 𝑎!  depending on the outcome received and 
the maximum action value of the state 𝑠!!!. The TD-RL model has three free parameters: the 
temperature, 𝛽; the learning rate, 𝛼, which controls the weight put on new information in actions' value 
actualization; and the discount rate, 𝛾. B Opportunity cost reinforcement learning (OC-RL) model. For 
each state 𝑠 in the environment, the agent computes, maintains, and updates the value of actions 
available in this state 𝑄 𝑠!! , 𝑎 , along with the value of the good stored in this state . At each 
time t, the values of available actions (i.e., accept and refuse the exchange) are transformed into 
probabilities of choosing the corresponding actions 𝑃 𝑠!! , 𝑎  when the agent is in a state 𝑠!. In the state 𝑠!, the selected action, 𝑎!, and the good held, 𝑔!, lead to a certain outcome and a certain state, 𝑠!!!. 
The outcome is used to update the value of the selected action, 𝑄 𝑠!! , 𝑎! , and the value of the good 
held, 𝑔!. In case of non-exchange, an opportunity cost, corresponding to the maximum value of the 
available actions in state 𝑠! but holding good 𝑔!!, is subtracted from the outcome of the trial and used 
to update the value of the good held, 𝑔!. The OC-RL model has three free parameters: the 
temperature, 𝛽; the factual learning rate, 𝛼; and the counterfactual learning rate, 𝜔.  
 
Fig. 3 | Schematic description of the computational principle underlying speculative behavior. 
A TD-RL model. The diagram represents the process via which the relative value of the speculative 
good increases in the TD-RL model. Speculating in the TD-RL model compulsorily requires an initial 
exploration of the dominated option to accept the speculative good, the value of which is a priori less 
than the value of refusing such an exchange, based on the underlying storage costs (𝑄 𝑠! , 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 <𝑄 𝑠! , 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 ). Once the speculative good is acquired, its subsequent exchange for the consumption 
good allows the value of consumption to back-propagate to the initial decision to accept the 
speculative good through the value of accepting the consumption good in the depicted 𝑠!!! state 𝑄 𝑠!!!, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 . B OC-RL model. The diagram schematically represents the process via which the 
relative value of speculative good increases through evaluation of the opportunity costs in the OC-RL 
model. Speculating in the OC-RL model does not require an initial exploration. The relative value of 
the speculative good can indeed increase even when the production good (i.e., the yellow good) is 
held. The inability to exchange the latter in the 𝑠! state will decrease its value 𝑉! 𝑔!"##$%  by incurring 
an opportunity cost represented by 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑄 𝑠!!"#$ , 𝑎 . C How the relative value of the speculative 
good increases in both models. The diagram represents the learning-induced value change for the 
speculative good in both models. In the TD-RL model (left), the speculative strategy is driven by an 
increase in the speculative good’s value. In the OC-RL model (right), the speculative strategy is driven 
by the reduction in the production good's value.  
 
Fig. 4 | Model Predictions and Model Selection. A Model Recovery Analysis. The confusion matrix 
represents the recovered model frequencies (white = 0; black = 1) for synthetic datasets simulated 
using the TD-RL model (top row) and the OC-RL model (bottom row). B Model comparison on the 
actual data. Bars show the estimated model frequency for each model of interest computed from the 
log-likelihood. The horizontal dashed line represents the chance level. C Evolution of the observed 
average speculative choice across the trials. The plot shows the proportion of speculative choices in 
both groups and its evolution across trials. D Evolution of the predicted average speculative choice 
across trials for the TD-RL model. The plot shows the predicted proportion of speculative choice in 
both groups and its evolution across trials. The gray shadow represents the data from panel A. E 
Evolution of the predicted average speculative choice across trials for the OC-RL model. The plot 
shows the predicted proportion of speculative choice in both groups and its evolution across trials. The 
gray shadow represents the data from panel A. F Best fitting model parameters. Bars show the 
average estimated OC-RL model parameters in both groups. 𝛽 is the temperature parameter, 𝛼 is the 
learning rate, and 𝜔 is the counterfactual learning rate. In C, D and E, dots represent the mean and 
error-bars the s.e.m. In F, bars represent the mean and error bars the s.e.m. *p< 0.05, in a two-sample 
two-sided t-test. 
  
Tables 
Optimization/ 
Model 
LLmax XP MF 
All Trials    
TD-RL 31.9 ± 2.8 0.0378 0.37 ± 0.05 
OC-RL 31.6 ± 3.0 0.9722 0.63 ± 0.05 
Speculation Only    
TD-RL 8.04 ± 0.84 0.0001 0.22 ± 0.03 
OC-RL 6.81 ± 0.83 0.9999 0.78 ± 0.03 
 
Table 1 | The table summarizes the fitting performances for each model. All Trials: the likelihood is 
calculated taking into account all trials. Speculation Only: the likelihood is calculated taking into 
account only the choice with an opportunity to speculate. LLmax, maximal log likelihood; XP, 
exceedance probability; MF, model frequency. Data are expressed as the mean ± s.e.m.  
 
Data Overall First Opp. Last Opp. 
Observed    
Speculators 0.77 ± 0.04 0.43 ± 0.11 0.86 ± 0.08 
Non-Speculators 0.15 ± 0.03 0.34 ± 0.09 0.09 ± 0.05 
TD-RL    
Speculators 0.67 ± 0.04 0.38 ± 0.02 0.78 ± 0.05 
Non-Speculators 0.14 ± 0.03 0.18 ± 0.03 0.10 ± 0.02 
OC-RL    
Speculators 0.76 ± 0.03 0.35 ± 0.05 0.85 ± 0.05 
Non-Speculators 0.14 ± 0.03 0.24 ± 0.04 0.09 ± 0.02 
    
Table 2 | The table summarizes, for each group of subjects, the actual and predicted average 
speculation decision overall and at the first and last opportunities.  
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nAgents	 Storing	Costs	 Consumption	Utility	 Beta	 nTrial	 nBlock	
480	 [1,	4,	9]	 100	 0.995	 200	 1	
Table	S1	|	The	table	summarizes	the	parameterization	of	the	virtual	economy:	"nAgents"	the	number	of	agents	
in	the	economy,	comprising	of	n-1	virtual	agents	and	1	real	subject;	"Storing	Costs"	the	storing	costs	value	for	
type	1,	2	and	3	goods	(in	our	setting,	cyan,	yellow,	magenta)	common	across	all	agents'	types;	"Consumption	
Utility"	the	utility	value	of	consumption	common	across	all	agents'	types;	"Beta"	the	discount	parameter	used	
to	determine	virtual	agents	strategies;	"nTrial"	the	total	number	of	trials	in	the	experiments;	"nBlock"	the	
number	of	subdivision	of	the	total	number	of	trials.	
	 	
		
Fig.	S1	|	Theoretical	Equilibrium	in	the	Experimental	Economy.	The	plot	shows	the	evolution	of	the	
three	 steady-state	 equilibrium	 proportions	 of	 production	 good	 held	 by	 the	 three	 types	 of	 agents.	
Colored	lines	represent	the	proportion	for	each	subject's	virtual	economy	individually	while	the	black	
thick	line	represents	the	average	proportion.	
	 	
	
Fig. S2 | Simulated Speculation Frequency at the Individual Level. The scatter plot 
represents each individual's observed speculation frequency in function of each predicted speculation 
frequency. Each dot represents a pair of observed and simulated speculation frequency for one 
individual and one model. Colors represent models of interest with OC-RL in orange, TD-RL model in 
blue and theoretical predictions in green (See Supplementary Methods below). Lines represent 
least-squares lines between observations and each model of interest's predictions. 
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Supplementary	Methods.	
We	 also	 computed	 the	 predictions	 of	 the	 original	 Kiyotaki	 and	 Wright	 model	 of	 money	
emergence	 on	 which	 the	 behavioral	 task	 is	 based	 (i.e.,	 derived	 from	 the	 equilibrium	
individual	prescriptions	on	optimal	strategies).	
KW	 model.	 The	 original	 Kiyotaki	 and	 Wright	 model	 is	 a	 theoretical	 model	 of	 money	
emergence	 characterizing	 conditions	 under	 which	 a	 particular	 commodity	 becomes	 a	
money.	More	precisely,	authors	describe	steady	state	equilibria	that	arise	according	to	the	
parametrization	of	 the	model.	 Similarly	as	 in	previous	 implementation	of	 the	model1,2,	we	
chose	a	 set	of	parameters	 compatible	with	 the	 speculative	equilibrium.	Then	a	 subpart	of	
the	 original	 model	 can	 be	 translated	 into	 decision	 rules	 for	 each	 agent	 in	 each	 possible	
situation	 in	 this	 economy,	 giving	 deterministic	 prescriptions	 that	 we	 used	 to	 create	 a	
decision	model	for	individual	agents	of	type	1	(the	only	agent's	type	we	analysed).	The	latter	
prescriptions	can	be	classified	according	to	four	main	rules:	
o Refusing	the	exchange	when	the	proposed	good	and	the	stored	good	are	of	the	same	
type.	
o Refusing	the	exchange	when	the	partner's	and	the	agent	are	of	the	same	type.	
o Accepting	the	exchange	when	the	proposed	good	is	the	agent's	consumption	good.	
o When	proposed	an	exchange	for	the	speculative	good:	
• Accepting	the	exchange	if	𝑐! − 𝑐! < 𝑝!" − 𝑝!"3 ∙ 𝛽𝑢# 1 	
Where	 c3	 and	 c2	 are	 the	 storage	 costs	 of	 goods	 3	 and	 2	 respectively,	 p31	 and	 p21	 the	
proportions	of	types	2	and	3	agents	respectively	holding	good	1,	u	the	utility	of	consumption	
and	β	a	discount	parameter.	
• Refusing	it	otherwise.	
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